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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Order Involving Plaintiff's Employer CCC&T 
The legislative history of the Liability Reform Act, and 
important terms in the Act, are ambiguous. However, it is clear that 
the legislature intended to abolish the unfair doctrine of joint and 
several liability by enacting the Liability Reform Act. The trial 
court committed reversible error by attempting to reestablish joint 
and several liability in this action, because the effect of its order 
may require Jacobsen to pay damages that the jury would otherwise 
apportion to plaintiff's employer CCC&T. This Court should reject the 
trial court's attempt to resurrect joint and several liability, and 
reaffirm the intent of the Liability Reform Act that a defendant will 
only be responsible to pay damages which correspond to its own 
conduct, and not the conduct of others. The Court should adopt an 
analysis based on causation, rather than on fault, in order to allow 
juries to fairly allocate responsibility for damages. 
Order Involving Cross-Claim Against Boman 
Boman must indemnify Jacobsen in accordance with the indemnity 
provision in the prime contract because such provision was validly 
incorporated by reference in the subcontract entered into between 
Jacobsen and Boman. The recent Utah Court of Appeals decision in 
Gordon v. CRS Consulting Engineers, Inc., 820 P. 2d 492 (Utah App. 
1991) establishes that an indemnity provision that is incorporated by 
reference in another document is enforceable. 
Alternatively, Boman is liable in indemnity to Jacobsen under the 
indemnity provision in the subcontract between Boman and Jacobsen. 
This indemnity liability results from involvement of Boman's agents 
CCC&T and plaintiff Daniel Brown in plaintiff's accident. 
1 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT'S ORDER CONCERNING PLAINTIFF'S 
EMPLOYER CCC&T CONSTITUTES REVERSIBLE ERROR. 
A. The district court's ruling that no 
evidence of CCC&T's conduct will be 
submitted to the jury was erroneous. 
As explained in Jacobsen's initial brief, the trial court not 
only ruled that CCC&T's "fault" could not be apportioned by the jury, 
but that evidence of its conduct would not be submitted to the jury. 
Jacobsen argued that this ruling was manifestly erroneous because it 
would not permit the jury to clearly understand how the accident 
happened, and would not allow Jacobsen to argue that CCC&T was the 
sole proximate cause of the accident. Notwithstanding the language 
in the order that "no evidence of CCC&T's conduct will be submitted 
to the finders of fact in this case" (R. 209) , appellees contend that 
the trial court did not rule that evidence of CCC&T's conduct would 
not be submitted to the jury, and that, in fact, the trial court's 
order would not prohibit Jacobsen from arguing that CCC&T was the sole 
proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries. Jacobsen observes that the 
express terms of the order speak for themselves, and clearly refute 
appellees' contention that Jacobsen has "overstated" the scope of the 
trial court's order. 
Second, with respect to appellee Brown's argument that the trial 
court's decision to preclude the jury from hearing evidence concerning 
CCC&T's conduct, even if erroneous, was harmless error, Jacobsen notes 
that Brown's argument is merely based on his interpretation of the 
facts. In effect, Brown's contention is that the facts demonstrate 
that CCC&T was not the sole proximate cause of the accident. This 
contention is without legal basis. The law is clear that on appeal 
2 
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B. The legislative history of the Liability 
Reform Act is ambiguous concerning the 
legislature's intent with respect to 
whether the conduct of the plaintiff's 
employer should be apportioned. 
Appellees CCC&T and Brown argue in their opposition nriefs that 
tin.- legit* lii I I I" history suppo - i, r interpretation of the Liability 
Reform. Act li, reality, t ho legislative history is ambiguous. The 
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apportioned by the finder of fact. Alternatively, it may have been 
the legislature's understanding that the change simply shortened and 
simplified the statute, without substantively changing its meaning and 
application. These possible reasons for the amendment are as 
plausible as the reason asserted by respondents, which is that the 
legislature intended to prohibit the finder of fact from considering 
the conduct of the plaintiff's employer in causing the injury. 
Appellees rely on certain other "evidence" of legislative intent, 
which they argue establishes their interpretation of the Liability 
Reform Act. CCC&T argues that the affidavit of Workers Compensation 
Fund counsel Dennis Lloyd is relevant, while Brown contends that a 
letter from Senator Cornaby is material to the question. Jacobsen 
responds that Mr. Lloyd's testimony is irrelevant. The mere fact that 
the Workers Compensation Fund opposed the bill in one form is 
irrelevant to this appeal. There is absolutely no evidence that the 
Workers Compensation Fund's opposition to the bill had anything to do 
with the bill's subsequent amendment by the legislature. The 
affidavit should be disregarded as irrelevant and immaterial. 
Concerning Senator Cornaby's letter, Jacobsen notes that the 
letter is not a part of the record on appeal. Under well-established 
principles of appellate review, plaintiff cannot rely upon materials 
which are not found in the record. Pilcher v. Department of Social 
Services. 663 P.2d 450, 453 (Utah 1983). In sum, the legislative 
history of the Liability Reform Act is anything but clear. 
Important terms used in the Liability Reform Act are also 
ambiguous. Specifically, the terms "fault" and "defendant," as used 
in the Act, are susceptible to different meanings. For example, 
"defendant" is defined in § 78-27-37(1) as "any person not immune from 
4 
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consider the hypothetical accident where a large piece of cement falls 
off of a state-owned overpass, and strikes the windshield of a car. 
The driver thereafter careens out of control, and his car strikes a 
three-year old on a tricycle, who was riding in the street. The 
driver later claims his brakes malfunctioned. 
Under the facts of this hypothetical, the State is probably 
immune from suit under the Governmental Immunity Act because the 
defective nature of the overpass was a latent condition for which 
immunity has not been waived. 1 Further, young children, as a matter 
of law, cannot have "fault" in Utah. 2 Moreover, the brake manufac-
turer, if liable for producing a defective product, would probably be 
liable under the doctrine of strict product liability, a theory of 
recovery not based on negligence. 
Jacobsen submits that it is clearly the intent of the Liability 
Reform Act that the jury which decides the merits of the lawsuit which 
ensues from the above accident be permitted to review the underlying 
facts of the entire accident in order to properly allocate responsi-
bility. In other words, the conduct of the State should be considered 
by the jury, even though it cannot be an actual "defendant" because 
of governmental immunity. Similarly, the jury should be able to 
consider whether the young child's conduct — even though not legally 
negligent or culpable — contributed to or caused the accident. 
Finally, it is obvious that damages caused by the "no-fault" concept 
of strict product liability can be compared to traditional fault based 
1
 See, Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(16). 
2
 See, Kiloack v. Wicmall, 604 P.2d 462 (Utah 1979). 
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 CCC&T relies on this Court's decisions in Phillips v. Union 
Pacific Railroad Co.. 614 P. 2d 153 (Utah 1980) and Curtis v. Harmon 
Electric. Inc.. 552 P.2d 117 (Utah 1976), and on certain portions 
of Larson's treatise on workers' compensation, in support of its 
contention Jacobsen notes that these authorities involve the 
issue of whether a third-party can circumvent the exclusive remedy 
provision of workers7 compensation to obtain contribution or 
indemnity from the injured person's employer. Under such circum-
stances, it is certainly reasonable to hold that an employer is 
immune from such actions on the basis that it cannot have conven-
tional "fault." In effect, the holdings in these cases simply 
reaffirm that workers' compensation is the exclusive remedy of an 
injured employee, and that an employer will never have to pay more 
money than is required under the Workers' Compensation Act. 
However, in this appeal the tort liability of CCC&T for indemnity 
or contribution is not an issue, and accordingly, the authorities 
relied on by CCC&T on this question have little relevance. 
7 
determined, the jury must consider the entire universe of factors that 
combined to cause the accident in question, Jacobsen submits that the 
purpose of the Liability Reform Act can be satisfied without 
contradicting the exclusive remedy provision of the Workers' 
Compensation Act by permitting juries to compare the conduct of 
employers, without holding them civilly liable. 
C. The trial court's order should be reversed 
because it attempts to reestablish the 
statutorily abrogated concept of joint and 
several liability. 
Although much of the legislature's purpose in enacting the 
Liability Reform Act is ambiguous, it is apparent that one of the 
paramount purposes of the Act was to completely and totally eliminate 
the doctrine and joint and several liability. The statute itself 
makes clear that "no defendant is liable to any person seeking 
recovery for any amount in excess of the proportion of fault attri-
butable to that defendant" (§ 78-27-38), and that "the maximum amount 
for which a defendant may be liable . . . is that percentage or 
proportion of the damages equivalent to the percentage or proportion 
of fault attributed to that defendant." (§ 78-27-40). 
The legislative history also establishes the legislature's intent 
to abolish joint and several liability. In this regard, it is impor-
tant to note that each preliminary draft of the Liability Reform Act, 
and the Bill as finally enacted, states in the title that the purpose 
of the Act, among other things, is "abolishing joint and several 
liability." (R. 174-75, 177-78, 180-84, attached as Addenda 6-8, 
Brief of CCC&T). 
Notwithstanding the legislature's obvious intent to completely 
abolish joint and several liability, CCC&T and plaintiff argue that 
8 
the trial court did not commit error when it retained joint and 
several liability in this case. Clearly, if the trial court's ruling 
is allowed to stand, Jacobsen may be put in the position of paying 
damages for conduct that would have otherwise been attributed to 
another person; i.e., plaintiff's employer CCC&T. Such an outcome is, 
quite simply, joint and several liability. Because one of the 
Liability Reform Act's primary purposes was to abolish this unfair 
doctrine, this Court should reject appellees' argument that the trial 
court did not err by ruling that the fault of all potentially 
responsible persons should not be apportioned by the jury. 
D. In light of the ambiguous legislative 
history behind the Liability Reform Act, 
the Act's clear intent to abolish joint and 
several liability, and the susceptibility 
of the Act's key terms to different 
meanings, Jacobsen proposes that this court 
analyze the issue in terms of "causation11 
rather than "fault." 
Given the ambiguity of the legislative history behind the 
Liability Reform Act, the susceptibility of the key words "fault" and 
"defendant" in the Act to different interpretations, and in light of 
the Act's clear purpose to abolish joint and several liability, 
Jacobsen suggests that use of the concept of causation will make the 
Liability Reform Act internally consistent, and allow fair treatment 
of all participants in an accident. 
Adopting a "causation" analysis, instead of one based on 
"fault," makes sense because of the confusion the word "fault" 
generates. It is unfortunate that the legislature decided to utilize 
"fault" in the Act because fault is the equivalent of negligence, and 
negligence is necessarily made up of the elements of (1) a duty, (2) 
breach of the duty, (3) proximate causation, and (4) damages. See, 
9 
Williams v. Melby. 699 P.2d 723 (Utah 1985). When "fault" is examined 
in this light, it is apparent why confusion can cloud the jury's 
process of apportioning "fault." The finder of fact cannot determine 
a particular defendant's percentage of "fault" until that defendant's 
role in the causation of the accident is understood. Further, it is 
obvious that for the finder of fact to determine a defendant's 
causation, the conduct of all participants in an action must be 
analyzed. In the case of an accident which occurs within the scope 
of employment, the analysis would necessarily include whether the 
employer's conduct contributed to cause the accident. Utah case 
authority supports the analysis of the apportionment of an employer's 
conduct in contributing to an accident in terms of causation, rather 
than in terms of fault. In Mulherin v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 628 P.2d 
1301 (Utah 1981), this Court required trial courts to apply a 
"comparative fault" rule between defendants under circumstances when 
one defendant may be liable under a strict liability theory, and 
another may be liable under a theory based in negligence. Id. at 
1303. In establishing this rule, this Court recognized that strict 
liability is not based on "fault," but held that the relative amount 
of "causation" of the defective product should be compared with the 
fault of other parties to achieve a fair apportionment of damages. 
Id. at 1304. This Court made the following observations in ruling 
that causation should be compared by the trier of fact: 
Other courts have rejected the application of comparative 
fault principles to strict liability claims because 
culpable conduct is not at issue in strict liability, only 
causation. We find this unpersuasive. There may be 
semantic difficulties in comparing strict liability and 
negligence, but we believe judges and juries will have no 
difficulty assigning the relative responsibility each is to 
bear for a particular injury when the ultimate issues in 
such comparison are relative fault and relative causation. 
10 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
The application of the Mulherin analysis to the issues in this 
appeal is appropriate. Although different categories of persons and 
entities may have different duties and liabilities, the comparison of 
all participants' "causation" is necessary for an equitable apportion-
ment of damages, and to avoid joint and several liability, a doctrine 
which the Liability Reform Act was designed to abolish. Indeed, 
causation is the one element common to virtually all vehicles of 
recovery, including strict product liability, breach of warranty and 
contract, workers' compensation, and negligence, in all of its 
degrees. In light of its truly universal nature, causation is the 
ideal concept to employ in the analysis of fairly apportioning 
liability for damages. 
Analyzing an employer's contribution to an accident in terms of 
causation, rather than fault, makes eminent sense. It is obvious that 
one can "cause" an injury without being at "fault," or culpable in 
some other manner. Under this analysis, after determining whether an 
employer caused the accident in whole or in part, a determination 
could then be made by the fact finder concerning the percentage of the 
plaintiff's damages that should be paid by the non-immune defendants. 
The special verdict form under this analysis could take the following 
form: 
Did the employer cause or contribute to the cause of the 
accident? 
Yes No 
If yes, what percentage of the accident was caused by the 
employer? % 
Did the defendant cause the accident? 
11 
If yes, was the defendant negligent? 
If yes, what percentage of plaintiff's damages should the 
defendant pay? % 
This analysis harmonizes the contradictory provisions within the 
Liability Reform Act, and fully retains the immunity granted to 
employers under the Workers Compensation Act. 
E. The decisions from other jurisdictions 
cited in Jacobsen's initial brief consti-
tute persuasive authority that the fault of 
all participants in an action must be 
apportioned to achieve fairness and equity. 
Appellees attempted to distinguish the facts of the numerous 
decisions cited by Jacobsen in its Opening Brief supporting the 
principle that the fault of all participants in an accident must be 
considered and apportioned by the finder of fact. It is true that 
each state has a slightly different statutory workers compensation and 
comparative fault scheme. However, as a general proposition, the 
cases overwhelmingly demonstrate that the courts in other jurisdic-
tions, whenever possible, have resolved the fault apportionment issues 
presented to them in a manner which maximizes the fairness associated 
with the process of apportioning fault. In other words, such 
decisions support the argument that, if possible, this Court should 
permit the allocation of an employer's conduct by the jury. 
Apportioning the plaintiff's employer's causation is not prohibited 
by the Liability Reform Act, and does not conflict with the exclusive 
remedy provision of the Workers' Compensation Act because no civil 
liability is imposed on the employer. 
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II. THE DISTRICT COURT'S ORDER CONCERNING BOMAN 
CONSTITUTES REVERSIBLE ERROR. 
A. Boman owes indemnity to Jacobsen pursuant 
to the indemnity provision in the prime 
contract. 
Clearly, the indemnity provision in the prime contract requires 
Boman to indemnify Jacobsen if that provision can be incorporated by 
reference in the subcontract between Boman and Jacobsen. Boman 
asserts various grounds for its argument that the indemnity agreement 
in the prime contract cannot be so incorporated. First, Boman argues 
that it need not indemnify Jacobsen under the indemnity provision of 
the prime contract because, under the strict construction rule, that 
indemnity provision cannot be incorporated by reference in the 
subcontract. Boman invokes the Utah Court of Appeals' decision in 
Gordon v. CRS Consulting Engineers, Inc., 820 P. 2d 492 (Utah App. 
1991) in support of this argument. The Gordon Court's statement that 
"Utah courts apply the rule of strict construction when confronted 
with an indemnity agreement," jLd. at 454, is expressly contradicted 
by this Court's ruling in Freund v. Utah Power & Light, 793 P.2d 362 
(Utah 1990) , wherein the strict construction rule was virtually 
abandoned. The Court of Appeals never referred to the Freund case in 
its opinion. 5 Obviously, the Court of Appeals7 erroneous holding in 
Gordon, which overlooked the contrary decision from this Court, is not 
persuasive. Freund did away with the traditional strict construction 
doctrine in Utah. Consequently, there is no legal reason not to 
permit the incorporation by reference of the indemnity provision in 
the prime contract, and enforce such provision against Boman. 
5Further, the briefs filed in the Gordon appeal never cited 
Freund, apparently because of oversight on counsel's part. 
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Boman also attempts to distinguish Freund from the facts of this 
case, because in Freund, "sophisticated entities had bargained for and 
prepared explicit indemnification agreements" which contained "clear 
and unequivocal language" after lengthy negotiations. (Brief of 
Boman, p. 11). This attempt to "distinguish" Freund from the facts 
in this action must be rejected. 
First, it is clear from the Freund decision that the primary 
factor in this Court's determination that the indemnitor was obligated 
to indemnify Utah Power & Light Company was the language in the 
contract. 793 P. 2d at 371-72. Further, to the extent the sophistica-
tion of the parties and the negotiation process were important to the 
Court's decision, Jacobsen notes that there is no evidence in the 
record to support Boman's representations that it is an unsophisti-
cated "mom and pop" steel fabrication company, that the subcontract 
is merely a "form," or that the subcontract contains "boilerplate 
language" (whatever that is). Rather, the evidence in the record is 
that Boman entered into a $603,056 subcontract to fabricate, supply 
and erect the structural steel for a multi-level office building (R. 
401-406), and that Boman entered into numerous contractual arrange-
ments with various entities in the course of completing its subcon-
tract, including Jacobsen, CCC&T and Miller Trucking. (R. 412-414). 
The record is thus replete with evidence that Boman is a sophisticated 
commercial entity with experience in the negotiation and fashioning 
of complex contracts involving large sums of money. Boman's attempt 
to characterize itself as small and unsophisticated is without factual 
basis. 
There is absolutely no reason not to apply this Court's holding 
in Freund in this appeal. Application of that decision means that the 
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heightened or strict construction rule is not applied to the indemnity 
contract in question. If that rule is not applied, the indemnity 
provision in the prime contract is enforceable against Boman. 
Boman also argues that, if Utah law permits the incorporation by 
reference of indemnity provisions, the relevant incorporation language 
in the subcontract is only applicable to "the work herein described," 
and that this phrase does not require Boman to indemnify Jacobsen. 
Boman reasons that because its contract with Jacobsen did not include 
any provision for installation of the safety cable, it has no indem-
nity obligation to Jacobsen because the cable is not part of the 
"work" described in the subcontract. 
Boman's simplistic approach to this argument ignores the 
undisputed fact that the "work" Boman was to perform pursuant to the 
subcontract was to "furnish material, fabrication and erection" of the 
building's structural steel. (R. 401). This broad definition of 
Boman's contractual responsibilities means that "the work" Boman was 
obligated to perform under the subcontract must be interpreted to 
include anything reasonably related to the erection of the building's 
structural steel. See, e.g., Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. El Paso 
Natural Gas Co. . 17 Utah 2d 255, 408 P.2d 910 (1965), where this Court 
explained that an indemnitee's rights under an indemnity contract "are 
not limited by the traditional tort concept of proximate cause." Id. 
at 913. 
Because it is undisputed that the plaintiff was involved in the 
building's erection when he fell, his accident obviously resulted from 
Boman's involvement in the "work." Boman's attempt to limit its 
indemnity exposure solely to the safety cable issue must be rejected 
because Boman's "work" under the subcontract broadly included the 
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completion of all steel erection, which plaintiff was working on when 
he fell. Further, Boman's argument ignores the factual background of 
the accident in this case. Plaintiff was not injured solely because 
there was no safety cable installed where he stepped off the building. 
Rather, the accident was caused by a myriad of factors, including 
plaintiff's losing track of where he was, and CCC&T's failure to train 
plaintiff to weld from the outside edge in. All of the factors that 
combined to cause the accident related, directly or indirectly, to the 
"work" Boman obligated itself to perform under the subcontract. Boman 
is thus obligated to indemnify Jacobsen. 
Boman cites cases from other jurisdictions which support its 
argument that the prime contract's indemnity provision cannot be 
incorporated by reference. Those decisions are inapplicable for 
several reasons. First, they all rely on the strict construction 
rule, which this Court largely rejected in Freund (see Reply Brief, 
supra, p. 13). 
Second, such decisions from other jurisdictions are irrelevant 
in light of the fact that the holding in Gordon v. CRS Consulting 
Engineers, Inc. that an indemnity provision can properly be incorpo-
rated by reference. In that case, the Court of Appeals sustained the 
validity of the indemnity agreement in the State's contract with 
Skyline Construction. Notably, the indemnity provision was not in the 
contract itself, but was rather incorporated by reference in a 
separate document entitled General Conditions and Specifications. 820 
P.2d at 494. Thus, Gordon establishes that indemnity provisions are 
enforceable when incorporated by reference. This position is 
completely harmonious with this Court's virtual abandonment of the 
strict construction rule in Freund* 
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Finally, the decisions from other states cited by Boman are 
distinguishable on their facts. In Wyoming Johnson, Inc. v. Stag 
Industries, 662 P. 2d 96 (Wyo. 1983), the Wyoming Supreme Court refused 
to enforce an indemnity clause which had been incorporated by 
reference because the incorporation provision in the subcontract was 
not sufficiently express and clear. However, in the captioned matter, 
it is apparent that Boman intended to be bound by the terms of the 
indemnity clause in the prime contract. This intent is clearly 
evidenced by the provision in the subcontract wherein Boman agreed 
that the indemnity clause in the prime contract is controlling in the 
event of contradiction with the indemnity provision in the subcon-
tract: 
Subcontractors shall indemnify contractor and/or owner 
against, and save each harmless from: 
* * * 
(2) any and all loss, damage, injury, liability and claims 
thereof for injuries to or death of persons . . . resulting 
directly or indirectly from subcontractor's performance of 
this agreement, regardless of the negligence of owner, 
contractor or their agents or employees: provided that 
where such loss, damage, injury, liability or claims are 
the result of active negligence on the part of owner or 
contractor or their respective agents or employees and is 
not caused or contributed to by omission to perform some 
duty also imposed on subcontractor, his agents or 
employees, such indemnity shall not apply to such party 
guilty of such active negligence unless the prime contrac-
tor documents otherwise provide . . . (emphasis added) 
Thus, Boman agreed that in the event of an inconsistency or contradic-
tion in the indemnification clauses found in the subcontract and prime 
contract, the prime contract would govern. This clear evidence of 
Boman7s intent to be bound by the prime contract distinguishes this 
matter from Wyoming Johnson. 
Allison Steel Manufacturing Co. v. Superior Court, 523 P.2d 803 
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(Ariz. App. 1974), is distinguishable on similar grounds. In Allison 
Steel, the subcontractor specifically agreed in the subcontract to 
perform according to the general contract "insofar as the terms [of 
the general contract] shall not be in conflict with the terms [of the 
subcontract]." Id. at 805. As set forth above, the opposite 
situation is present in this case. Whereas it was agreed between the 
parties in Allison Steel that the terms of the subcontract govern in 
the case of conflict between the two agreements, in the captioned 
matter, Boman agreed that the terms of the prime contract would 
control if a conflict between the two contracts arose. 
Boman also cites Goldman v. Ecco-Phoenix Electric Corp., 396 P. 2d 
377, 41 Cal. Rptr. 73 (1964) in support of its position. However, in 
Goldman The last clause of the incorporation provision in question 
was considered confusing and ambiguous. The incorporation clause read 
as follows: 
Subcontractor hereby agrees * * * to be bound to Clovis 
Construction Co. [the general contractor] in the same 
manner and to the same extent as Clovis is bound to the 
owner under the general contract, to the extent of work 
provided for in this agreement. 
Id. at 378, n. 1. The Court noted that the last phrase in the 
incorporation clause, "to the extent of work provided for in this 
agreement," allowed for two opposing interpretations. In contrast, 
the incorporation provision in the captioned matter is clear and 
unambiguous, simply stating: "Subcontractor specifically agrees to 
be bound to Contractor by all obligations of the prime contract as 
they may apply to the work herein described as if Contractor were in 
the place of the Owner, and Subcontractor were in the place of 
Contractor." (R. 401). 
Goldman is further distinguishable on the ground that the 
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subcontract did not contain any indemnity clause whatsoever, and the 
prime contractor attempted to impose the indemnity provision in the 
general contract through the "loose and obscure" language of the 
incorporation clause in the subcontract. However, in the captioned 
matter, Boman fully intended to indemnify Jacobsen, as evidenced by 
the indemnity provision found in its subcontract. 
Thus, even if the issue of whether an indemnity provision can be 
incorporated by reference had not already been established in Utah by 
the Court of Appeals' decision in Gordon, the cases relied on by Boman 
are distinguishable on their facts, and are inapplicable to the 
Court's consideration of the issues in this appeal. 
Finally, Boman argues that because the prime contract is a 
"standard" AIA document it should be unenforceable. This argument is, 
to say the least, puzzling. Neither Gordon nor Freund stand for the 
proposition that "form contracts" are not enforceable, particularly 
when commercial entities are the contracting parties. Indeed, AIA 6 
contracts have been enforced in a multitude of cases in most 
jurisdictions. See generally, AIA Building Construction Legal Citator 
(1987) . 
Summary 
The indemnity provision in the prime contract requires Boman to 
indemnify Jacobsen against "all claims . . . arising out of or 
resulting from the performance of the work . . . caused" by Boman's 
subcontractors. "The work" is defined in the prime contract as "the 
construction and services required by the contract documents, whether 
completed or partially completed, and includes all other labor, 
6
 "AIA" is the abbreviation for The American Institute of 
Architects. (R. 429). 
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materials, equipment and services provided or to be provided by the 
contractor to fulfil the contractor's obligations. The work may 
constitute the whole or a part of the project." (R. 434). 
Because Daniel Brown, and his employer CCC&T, were subcontractors 
of Boman, and were undisputably involved in the "work" when the 
accident occurred, Boman is responsible to indemnify Jacobsen under 
the clear terms of the indemnity provision in the prime contract. It 
makes no difference that Boman had little involvement at the site, or 
that Boman, personally, was not culpable in connection with Mr. 
Brown's accident. The concepts of "negligence" and "fault" are 
irrelevant in connection with Jacobsen's contractual indemnity claim 
against Boman. See, e.g., Buscaglia v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas, 68 
N.J.Super. 508, 515, 172 A.2d 703, 707 (1961), where the New Jersey 
Superior Court explained that "[cjausation, not negligence, is the 
touchstone" of indemnity liability. This Court should enforce the 
indemnity provision in the prime contract and rule that Boman is 
obligated to indemnify Jacobsen unless Jacobsen is found to be the 
sole cause of plaintiff's injuries. 
B. Boman owes indemnity to Jacobsen pursuant 
to the indemnity provision in the 
subcontract. 
Assuming that the indemnity provision of the prime contract is 
not enforceable on Boman, Boman argues that it does not owe indemnity 
under the provisions in its subcontract with Jacobsen. Again, Boman 
argues that it is not responsible to indemnify Jacobsen because the 
installation of the safety cables was not part of the "work" within 
the meaning of paragraph 8.D. of the subcontract. This argument 
misses the point. It is irrelevant that the safety cable was not part 
of Boman's performance under the subcontract. The issue is whether 
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the plaintiff's accident resulted "directly or indirectly from 
[Boman's] performance of the agreement." (R. 404-405). Boman 
concedes in its brief that the subcontract required Boman to "furnish 
material, fabrication, and erection" of the building's structural 
steel. Because it is undisputed that the plaintiff was involved in 
the building's erection when he fell, his accident "resulted" from 
Boman's performance of the agreement. 
Boman also argues that the indemnity provision in the subcontract 
is unenforceable because it does not specifically mention that Boman 
must indemnify for the acts of its independent contractors. This 
argument is without merit because Boman agreed to indemnify Jacobsen 
for all injuries resulting from its performance of the subcontract, 
and such agreement is clearly broad enough to encompass the actions 
of its subcontractors. 
Boman again contends that it is somehow relevant that it was not 
at the construction site often, and had little on-hands control of the 
steel erection. This is irrelevant. Indemnity liability is triggered 
by causation, not negligence. Buscacrlia, 172 A.2d at 707. 
Contrary to Boman's contentions, the Gordon decision is not 
controlling on this issue. In Gordon the indemnity agreement, as 
summarized by the Court of Appeals, contained "no language . . . 
indicating an intention to cover independent contractor performing 
services ..." 820 P. 2d at 495. In contrast, in this matter, Boman 
agreed to broadly and expansively indemnify Jacobsen for all damages 
resulting from its performance of the subcontract. Clearly, such 
language requires Boman to indemnify Jacobsen in this matter under the 
subcontract's indemnity provision. 
Finally, Boman argues that it is not liable to indemnify Jacobsen 
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under the indemnity provision in the subcontract because such provi-
sion only requires indemnity where Boman's agents caused the loss. 
Boman argues that CCC&T and Daniel Brown are not its agents under 
traditional principles of respondent superior, and that it therefore 
is not responsible in indemnity for their actions. Boman's conten-
tions ignore well-established law that "agents" in the indemnity 
context are not limited by the factors that are usually considered in 
determining whether an employer-employee relationship exists. 
Jacobsen's Opening Brief cited the decision of Baldwin Contracting Co. 
v. Winston. 263 Cal. App. 2d 565, 46 Cal. Rptr. 421 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1965) for the principle that the term "agent" in an indemnity agree-
ment can include the indemnitor's subcontractor. The court's holding 
in Baldwin is based on the Restatement (Second) of Torts, and on other 
courts' decisions, which imposed vicarious liability on employers of 
independent contractors under certain circumstances. The key to such 
liability is found in § 416 of the Restatement. That provision reads: 
One who employs an independent contractor to do work which 
the employer should recognize as likely to create during 
its progress a peculiar risk of physical harm to others 
unless special precautions are taken, is subject to liabil-
ity for physical harm caused to them by the failure of the 
contractor to exercise reasonable care to take such 
precautions, even though the employer has provided for such 
precautions in the contract or otherwise. 
The California Supreme Court invoked § 416 in Van Arsdale v. 
Hollinger. 437 P.2d 508, 66 Cal. Rptr. 20 (Cal. 1968), and Woolen v. 
Aerojet General Corp., 369 P.2d 708, 20 Cal. Rptr. 12 (Cal. 1962). 7 
Other persuasive authority on this issue is Western Contracting 
Corp. v. Southwest Steel Rolling Mills. Inc., 58 Cal. App. 3d 532, 129 
7In the Woolen case, the court held that the term "others" in 
§ 416 includes the employees of an independent contractor. 369 
P.2d at 711. 
22 
Cal. Rptr. 782 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976), where the plaintiff was killed 
in a dam construction project. The general contractor on the project 
was Western. Western's subcontractor was Southwest, the plaintiff's 
employer. Plaintiff's widow sued Western for her husband's death. 
Based upon a written indemnity agreement with plaintiff's employer, 
Western cross-claimed against Southwest. Southwest moved for summary 
judgment on the cross-claim for indemnity, which was granted. On 
appeal, the California Court of Appeals reversed. In so ruling, the 
Court held that general contractor Western could be vicariously liable 
for the acts of its independent contractor: 
Because Southwest Mills was not an employee of Western, the 
doctrine of respondeat superior was inapplicable. However, 
there are a number of exceptions to the general rule that 
one who employs an independent contractor is not liable for 
that contractor's negligence. Particularly significant to 
the immediate case is the exception which recognizes that 
the employer is liable when a contractor is employed to do 
"work in which there is a high degree of risk in relation 
to the particular surroundings, . . ." (Prosser on Torts 
(4th Ed.) p. 473; See also Rest. 2d, Torts § 416.) 
129 Cal. Rptr. at 786-87 (footnote omitted). 
The application of the above authorities to this appeal is 
apparent. The term "agent" in an indemnity agreement can include the 
indemnitor's subcontractor and the subcontractor's employees when the 
independent contractor is retained to engage in work that has a 
"peculiar risk;" i.e., is dangerous. In this matter, it is obvious 
that erecting the structural steel skeleton of a multi-story office 
building is dangerous in the extreme. Thus, in accordance with § 416 
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, and the other authorities cited 
above, Boman is obligated to indemnify Jacobsen under the indemnity 
provision in the subcontract because CCC&T and Brown are its "agents" 
within the meaning of the indemnity agreement. 
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C. It is irrelevant that CCC&T's negligence 
would have to be considered by the jury in 
establishing Boman/s indemnity liability to 
Jacobsen. 
Boman's final argument is that if Boman is liable to Jacobsen 
under its indemnity contract, its liability will result solely because 
of the acts of the plaintiff's employer, and that it would be improper 
for the jury to consider the negligence of plaintiff's employer in 
light of the trial court's ruling that the jury will not consider the 
conduct of CCC&T. This argument is without merit• First, it ignores 
Jacobsen's argument in this appeal that the trial court erred in 
ruling that such evidence could not be considered by the jury. 
Second, this Court has held that written contracts can vary the 
general rule that an employer is not liable to third parties because 
of the exclusive remedy provision of the Workers' Compensation Act. 
Shell Oil Company v. Brinkerhoff-Signal Drilling Co.. 658 P.2d 1187 
(Utah 1983) . If this Court is willing to vary the general rule to the 
degree that an employer is liable in money damages to a third party 
(as it did in the Shell decision) , it should certainly permit the jury 
to consider the employer's conduct for purposes of deciding if a party 
other than the employer is liable for damages under a written 
indemnity agreement. Furthermore, even if the Court believes it would 
be confusing for the jury to consider the plaintiff's injury claims 
and Jacobsen's indemnity claims on the same special verdict form or 
in the same proceeding, arrangements can certainly be made at the 
trial court level to separate those two claims, either by having the 
jury indicate their findings on different special verdict forms, or 
through bifurcating the personal injury and indemnity actions. 
In sum, the exclusive remedy provision of the Workers Compensa-
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tion Act was to protect employers from being liable in money damages 
to third parties. A third party such as Boman cannot invoke the 
exclusive remedy provision to protect it from its contractual 
indemnity obligations. Boman must indemnify Jacobsen pursuant to the 
indemnity agreement in the subcontract. 
CONCLUSION 
In order to arrive at a just verdict, the jury should be 
permitted to understand all the factors that were involved in Daniel 
Brown's accident, and apportion the causation attributable to all such 
factors before apportioning "fault." The trial court committed 
reversible error in not permitting such allocation on the special 
verdict form. 
The trial court also erred by granting Boman's Motion for Summary 
Judgment on Jacobsen's Cross-claim for contractual indemnity. Boman 
is obligated, under the indemnity provisions in both the prime 
contract and the subcontract, to indemnify Jacobsen. 
For the above reasons, Jacobsen respectfully requests the Court 
to reverse the district court's orders. 
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